Voices of Hindutva:
Creating and Exploiting Religious Binarie
This article is being published under a pseudonym, as the author fears that he would otherwise risk physical
injury. Though as a general policy the Journal of InterReligious Dialogue™ discourages the use of pseudonyms as
a potential hindrance to open and direct dialogue, it has made an exception due to the special circumstances of
the author and the desire to broaden the scope of dialogue to include more challenging topics to discuss.
Abstract
In 2002, Gujarat, India experienced a traumatizing episode of communal violence in which
Muslims, a religious minority, were actively targeted. It is widely believed that the state
government, run and influenced by extreme Hindu Nationalist (Hindutva) groups, may be
partly responsible for this. Although the extent of their logistical involvement is debated,
the rhetoric of many Hindutva organizations creates and demonizes a religious other. In
contrast to the majority of Hindus and the majority of Indians, leaders of a number of
Hindutva elements use language that creates pervasive religious binaries, which are
instrumental in the recurrence of violence. The political success of Hindutva groups in
Gujarat may therefore complicate peace‐building efforts, as illustrated by the dynamics of
responses by local non‐governmental organizations (NGO’s) to the violence.
On February 27, 2002, a train carrying Hindutva volunteers caught fire in the town
of Godhra, killing 55‐60 pilgrims inside one coach. Although various reasons have been
cited, including arson by a Muslim mob, the cause of the fire is still debated. The very next
day, communal riots erupted in the city of Ahmedabad and in some villages around the
state. The United States Government estimates that by the end of the period of rioting,
2,000 people were killed and 100,000 were displaced and moved to relief camps
(“International Religious Freedom”). Humanitarian organizations claim that up to 2,500
were killed and 140,000 were displaced (Parker 2008). These riots have been called
“pogroms” by professionals from various fields, including scholars such as Steven
Wilkinson (2005, 3) and Paul Brass (2003, 390), because of the highly disproportionate
number of Muslim casualties.
Allegations of governmental involvement are directed at the Sangh Parivar, a closely
linked family of organizations that promotes an extreme Hindu nationalist ideology called
Hindutva. Through its many branches, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Vishva
Hindu Parishad (VHP), and the Bajrang Dal, Hindutva ideology plays a significant role in
arenas as diverse as politics, education, youth organization, social mobilization, and even
paramilitary training. However, it is crucial to distinguish between Hindutva and Hindu,
because only a minority of Hindus and a minority of Indians support the ideology itself.
This piece is not intended as a polemic against Hindus, the vast majority of whom embrace
peaceful and tolerant belief systems. Rather, it uses the 2002 Gujarat Riots as a case study
to show how a well‐organized group can systematically wield rhetoric and political power
to establish a religious “other” and, arguably, call for violence.
Few dispute that Hindu‐Muslim riots yield tangible political gains for these Sangh
Parivar organizations (Brass 2003, 6). Their repeated democratic election, both in and
beyond Gujarat, may be construed as evidence of the effectiveness of their incendiary
rhetoric. But the link between their rhetoric and recurring communal violence has yet to be
widely appreciated. Notwithstanding their exact level of involvement in the 2002 Riots,
which is still being examined and debated, the messages put forth by Hindutva leaders
exaggerate two binaries: Hinduism versus Islam, and Hindus versus Muslims. This paper
seeks to demonstrate that these reified categories are then exploited to issue calls for inter‐
religious violence.
The first binary reified by Hindutva organizations is that of Hinduism versus Islam.
In an interview, the notorious VHP leader, Praveen Togadia, described Islam as having an
“exclusively totalitarian system (“We, Hindus and…”).” With help from madrasas in
spreading its fundamentalist ideologies, Islam encourages violent jihad and the killing of
non‐Muslims. In contrast, Togadia proclaims that “Hinduism is synonymous with harmony
(Ibid).” After creating this binary, he calls Islam’s intolerant ideologies the root of the
problem (Ibid). Praveen Togadia, having since been accused of participating in the riots
himself, is a high ranking official in the VHP, which the U.S. State Department cites as an
“extremist” organization that has instigated violence (Swami, “International Religious
Freedom,” Rajghatta).
Creating and Exploiting Religious Binarie
This article is being published under a pseudonym, as the author fears that he would otherwise risk physical
injury. Though as a general policy the Journal of InterReligious Dialogue™ discourages the use of pseudonyms as
a potential hindrance to open and direct dialogue, it has made an exception due to the special circumstances of
the author and the desire to broaden the scope of dialogue to include more challenging topics to discuss.
Abstract
In 2002, Gujarat, India experienced a traumatizing episode of communal violence in which
Muslims, a religious minority, were actively targeted. It is widely believed that the state
government, run and influenced by extreme Hindu Nationalist (Hindutva) groups, may be
partly responsible for this. Although the extent of their logistical involvement is debated,
the rhetoric of many Hindutva organizations creates and demonizes a religious other. In
contrast to the majority of Hindus and the majority of Indians, leaders of a number of
Hindutva elements use language that creates pervasive religious binaries, which are
instrumental in the recurrence of violence. The political success of Hindutva groups in
Gujarat may therefore complicate peace‐building efforts, as illustrated by the dynamics of
responses by local non‐governmental organizations (NGO’s) to the violence.
On February 27, 2002, a train carrying Hindutva volunteers caught fire in the town
of Godhra, killing 55‐60 pilgrims inside one coach. Although various reasons have been
cited, including arson by a Muslim mob, the cause of the fire is still debated. The very next
day, communal riots erupted in the city of Ahmedabad and in some villages around the
state. The United States Government estimates that by the end of the period of rioting,
2,000 people were killed and 100,000 were displaced and moved to relief camps
(“International Religious Freedom”). Humanitarian organizations claim that up to 2,500
were killed and 140,000 were displaced (Parker 2008). These riots have been called
“pogroms” by professionals from various fields, including scholars such as Steven
Wilkinson (2005, 3) and Paul Brass (2003, 390), because of the highly disproportionate
number of Muslim casualties.
Allegations of governmental involvement are directed at the Sangh Parivar, a closely
linked family of organizations that promotes an extreme Hindu nationalist ideology called
Hindutva. Through its many branches, including the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Vishva
Hindu Parishad (VHP), and the Bajrang Dal, Hindutva ideology plays a significant role in
arenas as diverse as politics, education, youth organization, social mobilization, and even
paramilitary training. However, it is crucial to distinguish between Hindutva and Hindu,
because only a minority of Hindus and a minority of Indians support the ideology itself.
This piece is not intended as a polemic against Hindus, the vast majority of whom embrace
peaceful and tolerant belief systems. Rather, it uses the 2002 Gujarat Riots as a case study
to show how a well‐organized group can systematically wield rhetoric and political power
to establish a religious “other” and, arguably, call for violence.
Few dispute that Hindu‐Muslim riots yield tangible political gains for these Sangh
Parivar organizations (Brass 2003, 6). Their repeated democratic election, both in and
beyond Gujarat, may be construed as evidence of the effectiveness of their incendiary
rhetoric. But the link between their rhetoric and recurring communal violence has yet to be
widely appreciated. Notwithstanding their exact level of involvement in the 2002 Riots,
which is still being examined and debated, the messages put forth by Hindutva leaders
exaggerate two binaries: Hinduism versus Islam, and Hindus versus Muslims. This paper
seeks to demonstrate that these reified categories are then exploited to issue calls for inter‐
religious violence.
The first binary reified by Hindutva organizations is that of Hinduism versus Islam.
In an interview, the notorious VHP leader, Praveen Togadia, described Islam as having an
“exclusively totalitarian system (“We, Hindus and…”).” With help from madrasas in
spreading its fundamentalist ideologies, Islam encourages violent jihad and the killing of
non‐Muslims. In contrast, Togadia proclaims that “Hinduism is synonymous with harmony
(Ibid).” After creating this binary, he calls Islam’s intolerant ideologies the root of the
problem (Ibid). Praveen Togadia, having since been accused of participating in the riots
himself, is a high ranking official in the VHP, which the U.S. State Department cites as an
“extremist” organization that has instigated violence (Swami, “International Religious
Freedom,” Rajghatta).
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